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Abstract	  
Reform	  represents	  a	  distinct	  mode	  of	  change	  within	  federal	  systems	  that	  can	  be	  distinguished	  
from	  passive	  adaptation.	  Through	  reform,	  political	  actors	  deliberately	  seek	  to	  alter	  parts	  of	  the	  
federal	   institutional	   architecture	   so	   as	   to	   modify	   or	   even	   reverse	   an	   established	   historical	  
trajectory.	  This	  study	  systematically	  explores	  the	  variety	  of	  reform	  patterns	   in	  federal	  systems	  
by	  looking	  at	  instances	  of	  institutional	  reforms	  in	  four	  federations	  (Australia,	  Canada,	  Germany	  
and	  Switzerland)	  since	  the	  early	  1990s.	  It	  demonstrates	  that	  reform	  patterns	  exhibit	  interesting	  
similarities	   and	   differences.	   To	   a	   great	   extent,	   these	   are	   largely	   contingent	   on	   the	   nature	   of	  
problems	   that	   different	   types	   of	   federalism	   tend	   to	   produce.	   The	   study	   detects	   similarities	  
between	   Australia	   and	   Canada,	   where	   federal	   reforms	   sought	   to	   strengthen	   mechanisms	   of	  
collaboration	   and	   to	   address	   the	   vertical	   fiscal	   imbalance,	   and	   between	   Germany	   and	  
Switzerland,	  where	  dis-­‐entanglement	  occurred	  as	  the	  leitmotiv	  of	  federal	  reforms.	  At	  the	  same	  
time,	   the	   study	   finds	   no	   systematic	   connection	   between	   one	   of	   the	   two	   identified	   reform	  
patterns	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   sustainability	   of	   federal	   reforms	   on	   the	   other	   hand.	   While	  
Australia	  and	  Switzerland	  seem	  to	  represent	  examples	  of	  rather	  sustainable	  reform	  pathways,	  in	  
Canada	  and	  Germany	  the	  gap	  between	  reform	  rhetoric	  and	  reform	  impact	  remains	  large.	  	  
Résumé	  
La	  réforme	  représente	  un	  mode	  distinct	  de	  changement	  à	  l’intérieur	  des	  systèmes	  fédéraux	  qui	  
peut	   être	   distinguée	   de	   l’adaptation	   passive.	   À	   travers	   une	   réforme,	   les	   acteurs	   politiques	  
cherchent	   délibérément	   à	   altérer	   des	   parties	   de	   l’architecture	   institutionnelle	   fédérale	   pour	  
modifier	   ou	  même	   renverser	   la	   trajectoire	   historique	   établie.	   	   Cette	   étude	   explore	   de	   façon	  
systématique	  la	  variété	  des	  modèles	  de	  réformes	  dans	  les	  systèmes	  fédéraux	  par	  l’observation	  
d’exemples	  de	  réformes	  institutionnelles	  dans	  quatre	  fédérations	  (Australie,	  Canada,	  Allemagne	  
et	  Suisse)	  depuis	   le	  début	  des	  années	  90.	  Elle	  démontre	  que	  les	  modèles	  de	  réformes	  ont	  des	  
similarités	   et	   des	   différences	   intéressantes	   qui,	   dans	   une	   large	   mesure,	   sont	   grandement	  
dépendantes	   de	   la	   nature	   des	   problèmes	   que	   tendent	   à	   produire	   les	   différents	   types	   de	  
fédéralismes.	   L’étude	   dénote	   des	   similarités	   entre	   l’Australie	   et	   le	   Canada	   où	   les	   réformes	  
fédérales	   ont	   cherché	   à	   renforcer	   les	   mécanismes	   de	   collaboration	   et	   à	   répondre	   au	  
déséquilibre	  fiscal	  vertical,	  et	  entre	  l’Allemagne	  et	  la	  Suisse	  où	  le	  dés-­‐enchevêtrement	  a	  été	  le	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leitmotiv	   des	   réformes	   fédérales.	   Dans	   un	   même	   temps,	   l’étude	   ne	   trouve	   aucun	   lien	  
systématique	   entre	   ces	   deux	   types	   de	   réforme	   et	   leur	   durabilité.	   Alors	   que	   l’Australie	   et	   la	  
Suisse	  semblent	  représenter	  des	  exemples	  d’avenues	  de	  réformes	  plutôt	  durables,	  au	  Canada	  et	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Reform	   is	   an	   important	   pattern	   of	   change	   in	   federal	   systems.	   Internal	   conflicts	   or	   external	  
developments	  such	  as	  the	  Global	  Financial	  Crisis	  can	  create	  challenges	  for	  federal	  systems	  that	  
require	   more	   than	   (rather	   reactive)	   adaptive	   responses.	   As	   a	   result,	   governments,	   political	  
parties	  and/or	  bureaucrats,	   sometimes	   supported	  by	   the	  media	  and	   the	  general	  public,	  often	  
call	  for	  more	  deliberate	  and	  explicit	  action	  through	  reform.	  	  
Canada,	  for	  example,	  has	  experienced	  ongoing	  efforts	  to	  reform	  its	  federal	  architecture.	  From	  
the	  large-­‐scale	  attempts	  to	  overhaul	  its	  federal	  architecture	  between	  the	  1970s	  and	  early	  1990s,	  
the	   so-­‐called	   era	   of	   “mega-­‐constitutional	   politics”	   (Russell	   2004),	   to	   the	   more	   focused	  
undertakings	   destined	   to	   fix	   a	   number	   of	   unresolved	   problems	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	  
Charlottetown	  Accord	  in	  1992,	  federal	  reform	  has	  been	  an	  persistent	  issue	  in	  Canadian	  politics.	  
Other	   federations	   have	   witnessed	   similar	   developments.	   Since	   the	   early	   1990s,	   Australian	  
federalism	   became	   a	   target	   of	   several	   reform	   initiatives	   yielding	   a	   series	   of	   institutional	  
innovations	  and	  new	  agreements	  between	  the	  Commonwealth	  and	  the	  states,	  most	  notably	  the	  
Council	   of	   Australian	   Governments	   (1992)	   or	   the	   Intergovernmental	   Agreement	   on	   Federal	  
Financial	  Relations	   (2008).	   In	  Germany,	   three	  major	   rounds	  of	  constitutional	   reform	  (1992-­‐94,	  
2004-­‐2006	  and	  2007-­‐2009)	  were	   initiated	  to	  recast	   the	  relationship	  between	  the	   federal	   level	  
and	  the	  Länder.	  Finally,	  Switzerland	  provides	  an	  interesting	  example	  for	  federal	  reform.	  Here,	  a	  
broadly	   conceived	   federal	   reform,	   the	   so-­‐called	  Neue	   Finanzausgleich	   (NFA),	  was	   launched	   in	  
1994.	   After	   an	   incremental,	   iterative	   process	   of	   agenda	   setting,	   guideline	   formulation	   and	  
ratification,	   this	   reform	   finally	  became	  enacted	   in	  2008,	  profoundly	   reshaping	   the	  established	  
relationships	  between	  the	  federal	  level	  and	  the	  Cantons.	  
These	  illustrative	  examples	  indicate	  that	  reforms	  in	  federal	  systems	  are	  omnipresent.	  However,	  
patterns	   of	   federal	   reforms	   display	   considerable	   variation	   across	   time	   and	   space	   (Broschek	  
2014;	  on	  a	  more	  general	  level:	  Benz	  and	  Broschek	  2013).	  This	  is	  basically	  a	  result	  of	  the	  nature	  
of	  problems	  to	  be	  addressed	  through	  reform	  as	  well	  as	  the	  strategic	  options	  reform	  advocates	  
have	   at	   their	   disposal	   to	   initiate	   and	   conduct	   reforms	   in	   light	   of	   potential	   opposition.	   In	  
addition,	   reform	   patterns	   differ	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   success.	   The	   formal	   enactment	   of	   a	   reform	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does	  not	  necessarily	  imply	  that	  a	  federal	  system	  changes	  exactly	  in	  the	  way	  reform	  proponents	  
had	   desired.	   While	   reform	   opponents	   are	   often	   not	   able	   to	   prevent	   the	   adoption	   of	   an	  
institutional	   or	   policy	   reform,	   they	   can	   still	   attempt	   to	   obstruct	   or	   even	   reverse	   a	   reform	  
outcome	   afterwards	   (Patashnik	   2008).	   This	   raises	   the	   question	   of	   reform	   sustainability	   that	  
means	  the	  capability	  of	  reforms	  to	  reconfigure	  political	  dynamics	  in	  the	  medium	  and	  long	  term.	  	  
This	   study	   compares	   the	   patterns	   of	   federal	   reforms	   in	   Australia,	   Canada,	   Germany	   and	  
Switzerland.	   It	   takes	  a	   look	  at	   formally	  enacted	   institutional	   reforms	   that	  have	  occurred	  since	  
the	  early	  1990s	  to	  explore	  convergent	  and	  divergent	  dynamics	  in	  the	  four	  federations.	  The	  main	  
finding	  suggests	  that	  reform	  patterns	  seem	  to	  resemble	  each	  other	  in	  Australia	  and	  Canada	  on	  
the	  one	  hand,	  in	  Germany	  and	  Switzerland	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  can	  be	  found	  
in	   substantial	   differences	   pertaining	   to	   the	   institutional	   architectures	   of	   the	   four	   federations.	  
Federalism	   in	   Australia	   and	   Canada	   is	   historically	   rooted	   in	   the	   principle	   of	   self-­‐rule.	   In	   both	  
cases,	   federalism	  was	   primarily	   conceived	   as	   a	  method	   to	   dualistically	   allocate	   competences	  
between	  the	  federal	  level	  and	  constituent	  units.	  In	  contrast,	  in	  Germany,	  and	  to	  some	  extent	  in	  
Switzerland	  as	  well,	  the	  principle	  of	  shared-­‐rule	  has	  evolved	  as	  a	  more	  dominant	  feature	  of	  the	  
federal	  institutional	  architecture.	  	  
Both	  types	  of	  federations	  tend	  to	  produce	  specific	  pathologies,	  which	  in	  turn	  shape	  the	  nature	  
of	   reforms.	   In	   Australia	   and	   Canada,	   institutional	   reforms	   have	   frequently	   been	   initiated	   to	  
address	   problems	   resulting	   from	   unilateralism,	   program	   overlap	   and	   duplication.	   These	  
problems	  typically	  arise	  when	  both	  tiers	  of	  government	  enjoy	  a	  great	  degree	  of	  freedom	  in	  the	  
way	  they	  assume	  their	  responsibilities.	  In	  Germany	  and	  Switzerland,	  the	  main	  purpose	  of	  recent	  
institutional	  reforms	  was	  to	  dis-­‐entangle	  governmental	  tiers	   in	  order	  to	  reduce	  the	  amount	  of	  
negotiation	   within	   the	   federation	   and,	   accordingly,	   to	   prevent	   lowest	   common	   denominator	  
outcomes	  or	  even	  deadlock.	  	  
Furthermore,	   in	   Australia	   and	   Canada	   federal	   reforms	   have	   emerged	   as	   non-­‐constitutional	  
change,	  while	  in	  Germany	  and	  Switzerland	  they	  surfaced	  as	  constitutional	  change.	  At	  the	  same	  
time,	   this	   study	   finds	   no	   systematic	   connection	   between	   one	   of	   the	   two	   identified	   reform	  
patterns	  and	  the	  sustainability	  of	  federal	  reforms.	  The	  gap	  between	  reform	  rhetoric	  and	  reform	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impact	  seems	  to	  be	  considerable	  in	  Canada	  and	  Germany.	  In	  contrast,	  Australia	  and	  Switzerland	  
seem	  to	  represent	  more	  sustainable	  instances	  of	  federal	  reform.	  
	  
Federal	  Architectures	  and	  Institutional	  Reform	  
The	  following	  analysis	  focuses	  on	  institutional	  reforms	  in	  federal	  systems,	  or	  what	  I	  call	  federal	  
institutional	   architectures.	   The	   architecture	   metaphor	   highlights	   that	   buildings	   and	   federal	  
systems	   share	   certain	   similarities.	   Like	  a	  house,	   a	   federal	   institutional	   architecture	   rests	  upon	  
building	   blocks	   that	   connect	   its	   constituent	   units	   with	   the	   federal	   “roof”,	   horizontally	   and	  
vertically.	   Four	   institutional	   building	   blocks	   constitute	   the	   foundation	   of	   any	   federal	  
architecture:	  the	  allocation	  of	  competences,	  fiscal	  federalism,	  the	  system	  of	  intergovernmental	  
relations	  as	  well	  as	  the	  second	  chamber.	  
Any	   federal	   architecture	   combines	   institutional	  mechanisms	   that	   create	   self-­‐rule	   and	   shared-­‐
rule	  between	   the	   federal	   level	  and	  constituent	  units.	   The	   federal	  principle	   is	   constituted	  by	  a	  
dialectical	   tension	   between	   territorial	   diversity	   and	   unity.	   This	   tension	   finds	   expression	   in	  
institutional	   rules	   that	   allow	   for	   self-­‐rule	   and	   shared-­‐rule	   (Elazar,	   1987).	   While	   self-­‐rule	  
promotes	   diversity,	   shared-­‐rule	   urges	   representatives	   from	   both	   tiers	   of	   government	   to	  
cooperate	   so	   as	   to	   reach	   a	   certain	   level	   of	   harmonization	   and,	   ultimately,	   unity.	   Historically,	  
however,	   federal	   systems	   evolve	   on	   trajectories	   that	   have	   variously	   balanced	   the	   inherent	  
tension	  between	  diversity	  and	  unity,	  thus	  accentuating	  either	  self-­‐rule	  or	  shared-­‐rule.	  While	  the	  
federal	  architecture	  in	  Canada	  and	  Australia	  has	  put	  stronger	  emphasis	  on	  self-­‐rule,	  shared-­‐rule	  
is	  the	  more	  dominant	  feature	  in	  case	  of	  Germany	  and	  Switzerland	  (Figure	  1).	  
Figure	  1:	  Institutional	  Architectures	  between	  Self-­‐Rule	  and	  Shared-­‐Rule	  
	  
	  
Self-­‐Rule	   Shared-­‐Rule	  
Canada	   Australia	   Switzerland	   Germany	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The	   federal	   state	   in	   Australia	   and	   Canada	   grew	   out	   of	   the	   British	   Empire.	   Federalization	   of	  
former	  colonies	  in	  both	  cases	  was	  influenced	  through	  the	  American	  experience	  rather	  than	  the	  
Continental	   European	   tradition	   of	   federalism.	   The	   drafters	   of	   both	   federal	   constitutions	  
envisaged	   a	   dual	   allocation	   of	   competences,	   separately	   fusing	   legislative,	   executive	   and	  
administrative	  power	  at	  each	  governmental	  tier,	  alongside	  a	  dual	  allocation	  of	  taxing	  authority.	  
Considering	   this	   pervasive	   dualism	   inherent	   to	   both	   institutional	   schemes,	   there	   was	   no	  
intention	   to	   institutionalize	   a	   strong	   system	   of	   intergovernmental	   relations.	   Shared-­‐rule	   was	  
primarily	   relegated	   to	   the	   second	   chamber.	   In	   formal	   terms	   at	   least,	   both	   the	  Australian	   and	  
Canadian	   Senate	   were	   installed	   as	   rather	   strong	   institutional	   pillars	   within	   the	   federal	  
architecture,	   allowing	   regional	   interests	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   at	   the	  
federal	  level.	  
Switzerland	   and	   Germany,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   are	   products	   of	   the	   Continental	   European	  
tradition	  of	  federalism.	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  federal	  architecture	  strongly	  tilts	  towards	  a	  functional	  
division	   of	   competences	   (Hueglin	   and	   Fenna	   2006).	   This	   feature	   is	   most	   obviously	   an	  
evolutionary	   trait	   of	   German	   federalism.	   During	   the	   early	   years	   of	   the	   first	   federation	   in	   the	  
German	   Empire	   (1871-­‐1918),	   the	   newly	   created	   federal	   level	   assumed	   more	   and	   more	  
competences,	   while	   the	   states’	   primary	   function	   was	   confined	   to	   the	   implementation	   of	  
(largely)	  federal	  legislation.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  they	  retained	  a	  strong	  role	  in	  decision-­‐making	  at	  
the	  federal	   level.	  This	  division	  of	   labor	  between	  the	  two	  tiers	  of	  government	  re-­‐emerged	  as	  a	  
defining	  feature	  of	   federalism	  after	  two	  critical	   junctures	   in	  1919	  and	  1949	  (Lehmbruch	  2002;	  
Broschek	   2010).	   Especially	   in	   the	   1950s	   and	   1960s,	   shared-­‐rule	   has	   been	   further	   reinforced	  
through	   a	   system	   of	   joint	   taxation,	   a	   generous	   horizontal	   equalization	   scheme,	   the	   so	   called	  
Gemeinschaftsaufgaben	   (constitutionalized	   joint	   tasks),	   a	   dense	   web	   of	   intergovernmental	  
bodies	   and	   institutions	   and,	   finally,	   through	   an	   incremental	   extension	   of	   Länder	  participation	  
rights	  through	  the	  Bundesrat.	  	  
The	  Swiss	  Cantons	  have	  always	  enjoyed	  much	  more	  autonomy	  than	  the	  German	  Länder.	  At	  the	  
same	  time,	  however,	  the	  federal	  architecture	  also	  displays	  strong	  features	  of	  shared-­‐rule.	  Over	  
the	  course	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  shared-­‐rule	  has	  become	  even	  more	  pronounced,	  despite	  of	  
the	  comparatively	  high	  degree	  of	  decentralization.	  In	  many	  areas,	  the	  federal	  level	  has	  assumed	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more	   competences,	  while	   the	   Cantons	  were	   primarily	   concerned	  with	   the	   implementation	   of	  
federal	  legislation	  (Vatter	  and	  Wälti	  2003).	  Self-­‐rule	  in	  the	  field	  of	  taxation,	  where	  the	  Cantons	  
traditionally	  had	  much	  leeway,	  was	  increasingly	  supplemented	  with	  mechanisms	  strengthening	  
shared-­‐rule,	  most	  notably	  the	  horizontal	  equalization	  scheme	  (originally	  introduced	  in	  1959)	  as	  
well	  as	  a	  growing	  system	  of	  federal	  grants.	  Like	  in	  Germany,	  the	  Swiss	  federal	  architecture	  also	  
features	  a	  dense	  web	  of	  horizontal	  and	  vertical	  intergovernmental	  bodies	  and	  institutions.	  The	  
strong	  second	  chamber,	  finally,	  is	  an	  additional	  institutional	  device	  firmly	  entangling	  both	  tiers	  
of	  government.	  
Self-­‐rule	  and	  shared-­‐rule	  mechanisms	  tend	  to	  produce	  distinct	  problems	  in	  federal	  systems.	  If	  a	  
federal	  architecture	  tilts	  too	  strongly	  towards	  the	  self-­‐rule	  pole,	  it	  lacks	  necessary	  mechanisms	  
that	  would	   facilitate	   cooperation	  between	  and	  among	  governments.	   Shared-­‐rule	  mechanisms	  
are	  particularly	  important	  in	  light	  of	  growing	  interdependencies.	  The	  more	  collective	  problems	  
demand	   sophisticated,	   well	   attuned	   responses,	   the	   more	   it	   becomes	   necessary	   to	   develop	  
institutionalized	   patterns	   of	   coordination	   and	   cooperation	   among	   jurisdictions	   who	   exercise	  
authority	  with	   varying	   spatial	   and	   functional	   reach.	   If	   such	  mechanisms	   are	   underdeveloped,	  
duplication,	  overlap	  of	   jurisdictions	  or	  unilateral	   encroachment	  of	  other	   jurisdictions	  occur	   as	  
typical	   pathologies	   in	   self-­‐rule	   architectures.	   Vice	   versa,	   if	   a	   federal	   architecture	   tilts	   too	  
strongly	   towards	   the	   shared-­‐rule	   pole,	   it	   might	   become	   “trapped”	   in	   joint	   decision-­‐making	  
(Scharpf	   1988).	   Too	   much,	   and,	   in	   particular,	   enforced	   collaboration	   (rather	   than	   voluntary	  
cooperation)	   often	   tends	   to	   blur	   responsibilities	   and	   promotes	   short-­‐sighted,	   opportunistic	  
behaviour	  among	  governments.	  Federal	  architectures	  that	  are	  strongly	  anchored	  in	  shared-­‐rule	  
create	   an	   environment	   that	   is	   hostile	   towards	   innovation	   and	   learning	   through	   yardstick	  
competition.	   It	   tends	   to	   produce	   lowest	   common	   denominator	   solutions	   or	   gets	   stuck	   in	  
deadlock.	  Even	  worse,	  as	  Fritz	  Scharpf’s	  work	  has	  shown,	  it	  is	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  escape	  joint-­‐
decision-­‐traps	  once	  they	  are	  established.	  
Federal	   reforms	  usually	   seek	   to	   address	   such	  problems.	  On	  a	  deeper	   level,	   therefore,	   federal	  
reforms	  aim	  to	  re-­‐balance	  the	  configuration	  of	  self-­‐rule	  and	  shared-­‐rule	  mechanisms	  entailed	  in	  
federal	  architectures	  (Broschek	  2014).	  To	  systematically	  compare	  the	  variety	  of	  reform	  patterns	  
found	  in	  federal	  systems,	  three	  questions	  seem	  to	  be	  of	  particular	  importance:	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1) What	  is	  the	  overarching	  goal	  of	  federal	  reforms?	  Do	  reform	  advocates	  attempt	  to	  cope	  with	  
pathologies	  originating	   from	   too	  much	   self-­‐rule	  by	   strengthening	   shared-­‐rule	  or	   the	  other	  
way	  around?	  
2) How	   do	   federal	   reforms	   differ	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   breadth	   and	   the	   underlying	   mode?	   Do	  
reform	  advocates	   target	   only	   a	   limited	  number	   of	   elements,	   or	   do	   they	   strive	   for	   a	  more	  
encompassing	  reform	  of	  the	  federal	  architecture?	  Do	  they	  envisage	  a	  constitutional	  reform,	  
or	  do	  they	  attempt	  to	  change	  the	  federal	  architecture	  by	  non-­‐constitutional	  means?	  
3) Are	   federal	   reforms	  sustainable	  not?	   In	  other	  words,	  what	   is	   the	  overall	   impact	  of	   federal	  
reforms?	  
	  
Strengthening	  Shared-­‐Rule	   through	  Non-­‐Constitutional	  Reforms:	   “Collaborative	  
Federalism”	  in	  Australia	  and	  Canada	  
Federalism	   in	   Australia	   and	   Canada	   has	   been	   suffering	   from	   a	   set	   of	   challenges	   that	   reveal	  
interesting	   similarities.2	   First,	   in	   both	   federations	   inter-­‐jurisdictional	   barriers	   impose	  
considerable	  problems	  for	  the	  domestic	  exchange	  of	  goods,	  services	  and	  the	  mobility	  of	  citizens.	  
Neither	   “negative	   integration”,	   that	   means	   the	   gradual	   removal	   of	   trade	   barriers	   and	   other	  
direct	  or	  indirect	  obstacles	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  single	  market,	  nor	  “positive	  integration”,	  
that	  means	   the	  harmonization	  of	   standards	  and	   infrastructures	   to	   facilitate	  market	  exchange,	  
have	  been	   completed.	   In	   a	   programmatic	   speech	   given	   in	   July	   1990,	   former	  Australian	   Prime	  
Minister	   Robert	   Hawke	   laments	   over	   the	   “balkanization”	   of	   the	   Australian	   economy,	   quoting	  
numerous	   examples	   ranging	   from	   highly	   skilled	   professionals	   struggling	   with	   different	   state	  
licensing	  boards	  to	  the	  magnitude	  of	  hurdles	  involved	  in	  sending	  a	  cargo	  container	  from	  Sydney	  
to	  Perth.	  The	  initiative	  “Free	  My	  Grapes”	  represents	  one	  recent	  example	  of	  how	  such	  barriers	  
                                                
2	   Irrespective	   of	   important	   differences	   that	   pertain	   especially	   to	   the	   distinct	   features	   of	   the	   societal	   context	   of	  
federalism.	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affect	  all	  day	   life	  of	  Canadians.	   Inter-­‐provincial	  restrictions	  for	  the	   individual	  purchase	  of	  wine	  
across	  provincial	  borders	  still	  hamper	  the	  flow	  of	  domestic	  wine.3	  
Second,	   another	   persistent	   feature	   of	   reform	   discourses	   in	   Australia	   and	   Canada	   is	   program	  
duplication	   and	   overlap.	   A	   dual	   allocation	   of	   competences	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   each	   tier	   of	  
government	  works	  within	  neatly	   tailored,	   “watershed	   compartments”.	   In	   practice,	   it	   is	   rather	  
difficult	   to	   clearly	   determine	   the	   boundaries	   of	   competences.	   Ambiguities	   in	   the	   wording	   of	  
constitutional	   provisions	   often	   lead	   governments	   to	   simultaneously	   engage	   in	   certain	   policy	  
fields	  through	  competition	  and/or	  concurrency.	  	  	  
Third,	   if	   shared-­‐rule	  mechanisms	   are	  weak,	   federal	   architectures	   encourage	   unilateral	   action.	  
Unilateralism	   can	   take	   quite	   different	   forms	   and	   is	   not	   necessarily	   destructive.	   For	   example,	  
unilateral	  initiatives	  can	  be	  an	  important	  prerequisite	  for	  benchmarking	  and	  learning,	  leading	  to	  
adaptive	  innovation	  through	  yardstick	  competition	  (Benz	  2012).	  However,	  it	  might	  also	  manifest	  
itself	   in	   opportunistic	   behavior,	   prompting	   a	   logic	   of	   “thrust	   and	   riposte”	   (Braun	   2000),	  
destructive	   competition,	   encroachment	   of	   jurisdictions	   and	   burden-­‐shifting	   (Bednar	   2009).	  
There	  is	  considerable	  evidence	  that	  Australia	  and	  Canada	  have	  both	  suffered	  from	  such	  negative	  
forms	   of	   unilateralism.	   For	   example,	   the	   Australian	   states	   have	   complained	   about	   the	  
Commonwealth’s	   dominant	   position	   within	   the	   federation.	   Through	   an	   expansive	   use	   of	   its	  
legislative	  powers	  and	  conditional	  grants,	  the	  Commonwealth	  has	  increasingly	  forced	  them	  into	  
a	   rather	  marginalized	  position	  of	  service	  providers.	   In	  Canada,	  provinces	  have	  blamed	  Ottawa	  
for	   encroaching	  upon	  areas	  of	   provincial	   jurisdiction	  by	  deploying	   the	  peace,	   order	   and	   good	  
government	  clause,	  the	  powers	  of	  reservation	  and	  disallowance	  or,	  since	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  
twentieth	  century,	  the	  spending	  power.	  	  
Finally,	  and	  often	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  federal	  unilateralism,	  both	  federations	  have	  witnessed	  a	  
discussion	   revolving	   around	   the	   so	   called	   vertical	   fiscal	   imbalance	   (VFI).	   The	   VFI	   indicates	   a	  
mismatch	   between	   revenue	   raising	   capacity	   and	   program	   responsibilities	   for	   either	  
governmental	  tier.	  In	  Australia	  and	  Canada,	  the	  states	  and	  the	  provinces	  have	  argued	  that	  they	  
                                                
3	  McKenna,	  Barrie:	  Provincial	  barriers	  still	  hamper	  the	  flow	  of	  domestic	  wine,	  in:	  The	  Globe	  and	  Mail,	  June	  30,	  2013.	  
and	  Free	  My	  Grapes,	  and	  imitative	  established	  by	  wine	  lovers	  in	  2010.	  http://freemygrapes.ca/	  [accessed	  April	  21,	  
2014].	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suffer	  from	  a	  growing	  VFI.	  Accordingly,	  constituent	  units	  in	  both	  federations	  claim	  that	  federal	  
revenues	   increasingly	   exceed	   the	   actual	   need.	   The	   states	   and	   provinces	   consider	   themselves	  
disadvantaged	  in	  light	  of	  their	  growing	  responsibilities	  for	  cost	  intensive	  services	  and	  programs,	  
most	  notably	  those	  related	  to	  health,	  education	  and	  other	  social	  services.	  In	  effect,	  the	  growing	  
VFI	  is	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  dualistic	  architecture,	  which	  has	  allowed	  the	  federal	  government	  to	  
(often	  unilaterally)	  pre-­‐empt	  tax	  room	  and	  to	  offload	  program	  responsibilities.	  	  	  	  	  
Since	   the	   early	   1990s,	   a	   series	   of	   federal	   reforms	  were	   initiated	   to	   address	   these	   issues.	   The	  
overarching	  reform	  goal	  was	  to	  redirect	  the	  federal	  architecture	  towards	  the	  shared-­‐rule	  pole	  
so	  as	  to	  contain	  the	  multifaceted	  pathologies	  emanating	  from	  uncoordinated,	  unilateral	  action.	  
The	  notion	  of	  “collaborative	  federalism”,	  which	  emerged	  in	  the	  academic	  and	  public	  discourse	  
that	   accompanied	   the	   reforms	   in	   both	   federations,	   nicely	   reflects	   the	   similarity	   of	   the	   main	  
reform	   direction	   (Painter	   2001;	   Cameron	   and	   Simeon	   2002;	   Lazar	   1998).	   Moreover,	   reforms	  
were	   focused	   rather	   than	   encompassing,	   targeting	   the	   system	  of	   intergovernmental	   relations	  
and	  fiscal	  federalism.	  Also,	  they	  occurred	  as	  non-­‐constitutional	  change.	  
	  
Australia	  
Collaborative	  federalism	  in	  Australia	  was	  initiated	  through	  several	  Special	  Premiers’	  Conferences	  
(SPC).	  The	  first	  SPC	  was	  held	  in	  Brisbane	  in	  October	  1990.	  The	  main	  purpose	  of	  the	  meeting	  was	  
to	   outline	   a	   framework	   for	   a	   more	   collaborative	   approach	   and	   to	   agree	   on	   a	   broad	   reform	  
agenda.	  In	  his	  opening	  statement,	  Hawke	  states	  
“…that	  never	  has	  the	  time	  been	  so	  propitious	  –	  as	   indeed,	   it	  has	  never	  been	  so	  urgent	  
and	  compelling	  –	  for	  a	  new	  effort,	  a	  new	  approach	  and	  a	  new	  spirit	  of	  co-­‐operation.	  […]	  I	  
cannot	  emphasize	  too	  strongly	  the	  need	  for	  us	  all	  to	  move	  our	  thinking	  beyond	  old	  fixed	  
ideas	  of	   centralism	  or	  State	   rights	  –	  of	   the	  Commonwealth	  versus	   the	  States.”	   (Hawke	  
1990a:	  2)	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He	   identified	   a	   broad	   range	   of	   issues	   that	   “cover	   the	   full	   range	   of	   intergovernmental	  
relationships”	   such	   as	   fiscal	   federalism	   (including	   tied	   grants),	   micro-­‐economic	   reform,	  
duplication	  of	  services	  the	  environment	  and	  industrial	  relations.	  	  
The	   Commonwealth	   and	   the	   states	   scheduled	   two	   SPCs	   for	   1991,	   the	   first	   for	   July	   and	   the	  
second	   for	   November,	   in	   order	   to	   continue	   their	   discussions	   and,	   ultimately,	   to	   reach	  
substantial	  decisions.	  Despite	  some	  setbacks,	  which	  were	  primarily	  due	  to	  the	  election	  of	  Paul	  
Keating,	  the	  reform	  process	  continued.	  Keating,	  an	  “uncompromising	  centralist”	  (Hollander	  and	  
Patapan	   2007:	   286),	   defeated	   Hawke	   in	   a	   leadership	   spill	   in	   the	   Australian	   Labour	   Party	   in	  
December	  1991.	  Yet,	  the	  Prime	  Minister,	  Premiers	  and	  Chief	  Ministers	  agreed	  to	  establish	  the	  
Council	  of	  Australian	  Governments	   (COAG)	   in	  May	  1992,	  a	  new	   intergovernmental	   forum	  that	  
represents	  the	  heart	  of	  collaborative	  federalism	  in	  Australia	  (Painter	  1996;	  1998;	  2001).	  	  
According	   to	   Martin	   Painter	   (2001)	   the	   introduction	   of	   COAG	   has	   moved	   intergovernmental	  
relations	  in	  Australia	  towards	  German-­‐style	  joint-­‐decision	  making.	  This	  interpretation,	  however,	  
somewhat	  stretches	  the	  point.	  COAG	  does	  not	  create	  an	  institutionalized	  system	  for	  compulsory	  
negotiations	  but	  a	  framework	  for	  cooperation	  through	  which	  the	  states	  are	  incorporated	  when	  
the	   federal	   government	   attempts	   to	   formulate	   national	   standards.	   Regardless	   of	   how	   one	  
ultimately	   assesses	  COAG’s	   role	   and	  performance	  within	   the	  Australian	   federal	   system,	   it	   has	  
certainly	   facilitated	   ongoing	   exchange	   between	   governments	   (including	   local	   governments).	  
COAG	   features	   a	   secretariat	   which	   is	   located	   in	   the	   Department	   of	   the	   Prime	   Minister	   and	  
Cabinet.	   Its	   organizational	   structure	   has	   become	   more	   diversified	   over	   time,	   comprising	  
standing	  and	  temporary	  councils.	  	  
A	   second	   reform	   sought	   to	   address	   primarily	   the	   VFI.	   Although	   Bob	   Hawke	   initially	   had	  
announced	   that	   the	   Commonwealth	   was	   prepared	   to	   make	   substantial	   concessions	   to	   the	  
states,4	  fiscal	  federalism	  did	  not	  occur	  as	  a	  major	  reform	  target.	  It	  was	  under	  the	  Liberal	  Prime	  
Minister	  John	  Howard,	  who	  was	  otherwise	  more	  than	  reluctant	  to	  breathe	  life	  into	  the	  nascent	  
institutions	   of	   collaborative	   federalism,	   that	   the	   states	   were	   furnished	   with	   a	   new	   revenue	  
                                                
4	  In	  his	  opening	  statement	  to	  the	  first	  SPC,	  Bob	  Hawke	  (1991a:	  2)	  announced:	  “The	  commitment	  I	  am	  prepared	  to	  
make	   on	   the	   Commonwealth’s	   behalf	   to	   work	   with	   the	   States	   towards	   a	   substantial	   reduction	   in	   tied	   grants	  
represents	  a	  fundamental	  change	  in	  direction.”	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source,	   the	  Goods	  and	  Service	  Tax	   (GST).	  The	   Intergovernmental	  Agreement	  on	  the	  Reform	  of	  
Commonwealth-­‐States	  Financial	  Relations,	  agreed	  upon	  in	  1999,	  was	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  tax	  reform	  
of	  the	  liberal	  government	  (Fenna	  2007).	  The	  Commonwealth	  transfers	  GST	  revenues	  completely	  
to	   the	   states	   (minus	   a	   deductible	   to	   compensate	   for	   administration	   costs).	   In	   exchange,	   the	  
states	   agreed	   to	   abolish	   a	   set	   of	   specified	   taxes.	   The	   agreement	   also	   outlines	   rules	   for	   the	  
management	  and	  administration	  through	  the	  newly	  created	  Ministerial	  Council	  which	  are	  highly	  
consistent	   with	   the	   principles	   of	   collaborative	   federalism.	   Provisions	   for	   shared-­‐rule	   are	  
entrenched	   in	  Part	  3	  of	   the	  agreement.	  Most	   importantly,	   they	  require	  unanimous	  support	  of	  
the	  state	  and	  territory	  governments	  to	  vary	  the	  tax	  rate	  and	  base.	  	  
Despite	   this	   agreement,	   the	   federal	   government	   during	   the	  Howard	   era	   (1996-­‐2007)	   showed	  
little	   interest	   in	   promoting	   intergovernmental	   relations.	   This	   lack	   of	   engagement	   spurred	   the	  
states’	  effort	   to	  strengthen	  horizontal	   linkages	  within	   the	   federal	  architecture.	   In	  2006,	   states	  
and	  territories	  created	  the	  Council	  for	  the	  Australian	  Federation	  (CAF).	  As	  an	  exclusive	  horizontal	  
body,	   the	  CAF	  consists	  of	   the	   state	  and	   territory	  premiers	  or	   chief	  ministers	  and	  has	  a	   jointly	  
funded	   secretariat	   to	   assist	   the	   chair	   and	   the	   council.	   The	   main	   purpose	   of	   the	   CAF	   is	   to	  
formulate	   positions	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   Commonwealth	   in	   a	   broad	   range	   of	   issues	   and	   to	   take	   a	  
leadership	  role	  in	  important	  areas	  of	  national	  concern	  where	  the	  Commonwealth	  abstains	  from	  
being	  active.	  
Finally,	  Australian	  federalism	  witnessed	  a	  revitalization	  of	  collaborative	  federalism	  under	  Labour	  
premier	   Kevin	   Rudd,	   who	   succeeded	   Howard	   in	   2007.	   This	   included	   a	   reactivation	   of	   COAG,	  
whose	   internal	   structure	   became	   more	   diversified	   and	   committed	   to	   facilitate	   an	   ongoing	  
reform	  process,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  new	   Intergovernmental	  Agreement	  on	  Federal	  Financial	  Relations	  
(IGAFFR),	   signed	   in	   2008.	   The	   IGAFFR	   replaces	   the	   1999	   agreement	   and	   establishes	   a	   new	  
framework	  for	  collaboration	  in	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  policy	  areas.	  While	  the	  states	  are	  provided	  with	  
more	  flexibility	  on	  how	  they	  spend	  Commonwealth	  transfers	  based	  on	  mutually	  agreed	  policy	  
goals,	  both	  tiers	  of	  government,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  commit	  themselves	  to	  greater	  accountability	  
based	   on	   new	   reporting	   requirements.	   In	   particular,	   the	   agreement	   promises	   to	   improve	  
transparency	  based	  on	  performance	  indicators	  and	  benchmarking.	  




In	  Canada,	  collaborative	  federalism	  emerged	  on	  the	   initiative	  of	  the	  provinces	  rather	  than	  the	  
federal	   government.	   The	   call	   for	   reform	   was	   largely	   triggered	   by	   a	   number	   of	   unilateral	  
decisions	  taken	  by	  the	  liberal	  government	  under	  Jean	  Chrétien	  since	  the	  mind	  1990s.	  Chrétien	  
and	   Finance	  Minister	   Paul	  Martin	   first	   introduced	  drastic	   budget	   cuts	   through	   their	   landmark	  
1995-­‐96	  budget.	  Through	   the	  unilateral	  and	  unexpected	  budget	   cuts,	   the	   federal	   government	  
structurally	   and	   substantially	   changed	   the	   transfer	   system	   and	   announced	   a	   fundamental	  
reform	  of	  Unemployment	  Insurance	  (UI)	  for	  1996.	  The	  existing	  Established	  Programs	  Financing	  
(EPF)	  and	  the	  Canada	  Assistance	  Plan	   (CAP)	  were	  replaced	  with	  the	  Canada	  Health	  and	  Social	  
Transfer	  (CHST)	  and	  cut	  by	  4.4	  per	  cent	  (Government	  of	  Canada	  1995:	  19).	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  
drastically	  tightened	  eligibility	  criteria,	  UI	  reform	  in	  1996	  indirectly	  imposed	  further	  costs	  on	  the	  
provinces	   as	   a	   large	   share	   of	   unemployed	   now	   became	   social	   assistance	   claimants	   (Boychuk	  
2001).	   Once	   the	   federal	   government	   had	   entered	   the	   “post-­‐deficit	   era”	   in	   the	   late	   1990s,	   it	  
began	   to	   launch	   a	   number	   of	   new	   programs	   which	   often	   fell	   into	   exclusive	   provincial	  
jurisdictions.	   These	   initiatives	   not	   only	   fostered	   the	   impression	   of	   ongoing	   unilateral	   and	  
illegitimate	   transgression	   of	   constitutional	   boundaries,	   but	   also	   sparked	   the	   debate	   around	   a	  
growing	  VFI.	  	  
Collaborative	  federalism	  manifested	   itself	   in	  a	  series	  of	  changes.	  Some	  of	  them	  were	  sectorial	  
and	  policy	   related,	   like	   the	  National	  Child	  Benefit	   (NCB)	  of	  1998,	   the	  Health	  Accords	   of	   2000,	  
2003	  and	  2004	  or	  several	  bilateral	  agreements	  between	  the	  Ottawa	  and	  individual	  provinces	  in	  
the	  field	  of	  child	  care	  and	  early	  learning	  development.	  Others	  focused	  on	  the	  institutional	  level.	  
These	   reform	   initiatives	   envisaged	   the	   creation	   of	   new	   rules	   that	   would	   more	   generally	  
strengthen	  shared-­‐rule	  within	  the	  federal	  architecture.	  
A	   first	   important	   step	   towards	   collaborative	   federalism	   was	   the	   Social	   Union	   Framework	  
Agreement	   (SUFA).	   Despite	   reluctance	   on	   behalf	   of	   Ottawa	   to	   enter	   negotiations	   with	   the	  
provinces,	   both	   tiers	   of	   government	   –	   with	   the	   exception	   of	   Quebec	   -­‐	   eventually	   signed	   the	  
SUFA	   in	   1999.	   SUFA’s	   main	   provisions	   emerged	   from	   a	   number	   of	   reports	   that	   had	   been	  
prepared	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  Provincial/Territorial	  Council	  on	  Social	  Policy	  Renewal	  since	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1996.	  Most	  notably,	  the	  provinces	  demanded	  a	  serious	  commitment	  of	  the	  federal	  government	  
to	  establish	  a	  new	  collaborative	  partnership,	   stable	  and	  adequate	   federal	   financial	   support	  as	  
well	  as	  an	  end	  of	  federal	  unilateralism	  in	  areas	  of	  provincial	   jurisdictions	  (Provincial/Territorial	  
Council	   on	   Social	   Policy	   Renewal	   1998:	   3).	   In	   the	   agreement,	   the	   signatories	   express	   a	  
willingness	   to	  work	  more	   closely	   together.	   Overall,	   it	   contains	   seven	   sections,	   outlining	   basic	  
principles,	   a	   commitment	   to	   reduce	   barriers	   to	   mobility,	   to	   enhance	   accountability	   and	  
transparency	  and	  to	  collaboratively	  resolve	  disputes.	  Section	  4	  and	  5	  are	  crucial	  because	  they	  
represent	  an	  attempt	  to	  define	  rules	  for	  joint	  planning	  and	  cooperation	  as	  well	  as	  for	  the	  use	  of	  
the	  federal	  spending	  power.	  	  
A	   second	   institutional	   innovation	  originated	   from	  an	   initiative	   launched	  by	   the	   newly	   elected	  
liberal	  Quebec	  government	  under	  Jean	  Charest	  in	  2003.	  Under	  the	  auspices	  of	  Benoît	  Pelletier	  
the	   Liberal	   Party	   of	   Quebec	   (PLQ)	   sought	   to	   develop	   a	   new,	   more	   constructive	   approach	   to	  
intergovernmental	  relations.	  A	  report	  released	  in	  2001	  emphasized	  the	  need	  for	  Quebec	  to	  take	  
a	  leadership	  role	  in	  renewing	  Canadian	  federalism,	  primarily	  through	  “interprovincialism”,	  that	  
means	   closer	   horizontal	   ties	   among	   the	  provinces	   (Pelletier	   2001).	  After	   the	  PLQ	  was	   able	   to	  
remove	  the	  Parti	  Quebecois	  government	  out	  of	  office	  in	  the	  2003	  election,	  Charest	  turned	  this	  
promise	  into	  action,	  initiating	  negotiations	  that	  ultimately	  led	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  
the	  Federation	   in	  December	  2003.	   In	  effect,	   the	  Council	  of	  the	  Federation	   institutionalizes	  the	  
former	   Annual	   Premiers’	   Conference	   (APC)	   (Meekison	   et	   al.	   2004).	   Members	   are	   the	  
governments	  of	  the	  provinces	  and	  the	  territories.	  The	  council	  features	  an	  own	  secretariat	  and	  is	  
supposed	   to	  meet	   at	   least	   two	   times	   per	   year.	   The	  main	   objectives	   are	   the	   development	   of	  
closer	  ties	  among	  the	  provinces	  and	  to	  exercise	  leadership	  on	  national	  issues	  of	  importance	  to	  
provinces	  and	  territories.	  
In	   addition	   to	   these	   efforts	   destined	   to	   strengthen	   shared-­‐rule	   in	   the	   system	   of	  
intergovernmental	   relations,	   fiscal	   federalism	   became	   a	   reform	   target.	   In	   particular,	   the	  
equalization	  program	  underwent	  two	  reforms.	  Addressing	  growing	  provincial	  concerns	  over	  an	  
expected	  decreasing	  pool	  sum	  for	  equalization	  as	  well	  as	  rising	  interprovincial	  conflict	  over	  the	  
calculation	  of	  entitlements,	  the	  liberal	  Martin	  government	  introduced	  a	  new	  framework	  which	  
fixed	  a	  minimum	  floor	  and	  modified	  the	   formula.	  Furthermore,	   the	   federal	  government	  made	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bilateral	   agreements	  with	   Nova	   Scotia	   and	  Newfoundland	  which	   offered	   those	   two	   receiving	  
provinces	   special	   provisions	   to	   deal	   with	   their	   increasing	   revenues	   from	   off-­‐shore	   oil	  
development.	   In	  2007,	   the	  newly	  elected	  Harper	   government	   replaced	   this	   arrangement.	   The	  
2007	   equalization	   reform	   broadened	   the	   standard	   for	   equalization	   by	   including	   all	   provinces	  
rather	  than	  the	  “five-­‐province-­‐standard”,	  further	  increased	  the	  pool	  sum	  and	  excluded	  resource	  
revenues	  almost	  entirely	  from	  the	  calculation	  of	  entitlements	  (Lecours	  and	  Béland	  2010;	  Brown	  
2012).	  
	  
Strengthening	   Self-­‐Rule	   through	   Constitutional	   Reforms:	   Dis-­‐Entanglement	   in	  
Germany	  and	  Switzerland	  	  
In	  many	  respects,	  major	  reform	  goals	  in	  Germany	  and	  Switzerland	  since	  the	  early	  1990s	  pointed	  
exactly	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction	  than	  those	  in	  Australia	  and	  Canada.	  The	  set	  of	  problems	  federal	  
reforms	   in	   the	   two	   European	   federations	   sought	   to	   address	   arose	   largely	   from	   “too	   much”	  
shared-­‐rule.	   First,	   due	   to	   manifold	   requirements	   fostering	   collaboration	   between	   levels	   of	  
government,	   federalism	   was	   largely	   considered	   as	   inefficient,	   hampering	   the	   production	   of	  
adequate	  and	  rapid	  solutions	  to	  pressing	  policy	  problems.	  There	  was	  a	  widespread	  perception	  
among	   political	   actors	   and	   the	   larger	   public	   that	   federalism	   is	   responsible	   for	   prolonged	  
negotiations	  that	  often	  lead	  to	  agreements	  reflecting	  the	  lowest	  common	  denominator.	  
Second,	   entanglement	   between	   both	   tiers	   of	   government	   was	   also	   blamed	   for	   generating	  
democratic	  deficits.	  Often	  policy	  outcomes	  could	  only	  be	  achieved	  if	  all	   (or	  at	   least	  a	  qualified	  
majority)	  of	  governments	  had	  come	  to	  an	  agreement.	  The	  missing	  exit	  option	  in	  joint-­‐decision	  
making	   arrangements	   encourages	   blame	   avoidance	   for	   unpopular	   decisions.	   While	  
intergovernmental	  decision-­‐making	  generally	   involves	  negotiations	  behind	  closed	  doors,	   joint-­‐
decision	   making	   tends	   to	   exacerbate	   democratic	   deficits	   because	   it	   blurs	   political	  
responsibilities	  much	  more	  than	  in	  federations	  resting	  on	  an	  institutional	  architecture	  in	  which	  
self-­‐rule	   looms	   large.	   As	   Fritz	   W.	   Scharpf	   has	   aptly	   put	   it	   with	   respect	   to	   federal	   politics	   in	  
Germany:	  “No	  one	  really	  wants	  what	  is	  done,	  and	  no	  one	  will	  accept	  responsibility	  for	  it”.	  5	  	  
                                                
5	  Cited	  in	  Schultze	  2003	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Finally,	  constituent	  units	  -­‐	  the	  German	  Länder	  and	  Swiss	  Cantons	  -­‐	  lamented	  an	  ongoing	  decline	  
of	  autonomy.	  In	  particular	  the	  functional	  division	  of	  competences	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  their	  
capacity	   to	   legislate	   independently.	   Rather,	   they	   appear	   to	   have	   been	   relegated	   to	   agencies	  
whose	  main	  purpose	  is	  to	  implement	  federal	  legislation.	  In	  addition,	  reform	  advocates	  identified	  
fiscal	  federalism	  as	  an	  important	  cause	  for	  undermining	  local	  autonomy.	  
Accordingly,	   dis-­‐entanglement	   emerged	   as	   the	   leitmotiv	   of	   federal	   reforms	   in	   Germany	   and	  
Switzerland	  since	  the	  early	  1990s.	  In	  order	  to	  tackle	  perceived	  pathologies	  such	  as	  inefficiency,	  
democratic	   deficits	   and	   decreasing	   autonomy,	   the	   federal	   architecture	   was	   to	   be	   redirected	  
from	  the	  shared-­‐rule	  pole	  towards	  self-­‐rule.	  In	  both	  federations,	  reform	  proponents	  evoked	  the	  
idea	  of	  subsidiarity	  to	  indicate	  the	  main	  direction	  of	  reform:	  Tasks	  and	  corresponding	  financial	  
resources	   should	   be	   reallocated	   in	   a	  way	   that	   promotes	   autonomous	   fulfillment	   on	   the	   local	  
level	   whenever	   possible.	   Unlike	   in	   Australia	   and	   Canada,	   reforms	   were	   carried	   out	   as	  
constitutional	  change	  and	  more	  comprehensive.	  Rebalancing	  shared-­‐rule	  and	  self-­‐rule	  was	  thus	  
envisaged	  as	  a	  more	  encompassing	  endeavor	  requiring	  a	  major	  institutional	  reconfiguration	  of	  
the	  federal	  architecture.	  
	  
Germany	  	  	  
The	   early	   1990s	  mark	   an	   important	   turning	   point	   for	   German	   federalism.	   The	   addition	   of	   six	  
new,	   structurally	   rather	   weak	   Länder	   after	   Reunification	   substantially	   amplified	   economic	  
disparities	   and	   cultural	   diversity	   within	   the	   federation.	   This,	   in	   turn,	   generated	   frictions	   for	  
federal	   politics,	   mainly	   caused	   by	   increasing	   mismatch	   between	   the	   socio-­‐economic,	   socio-­‐
cultural	   and	   ideational	   foundations	   of	   federalism	   on	   the	   one,	   the	   inherited,	   highly	   entangled	  
institutional	  architecture	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  (Benz	  1999;	  Broschek	  2010;	  Scharpf	  2008;	  Schultze	  
1999).	   European	   integration	   further	   reinforced	   this	   trend	   as	   the	   newly	   emerging	   common	  
market	   created	   a	   new	   incentive	   structure.	   The	   Länder	   were	   anxious	   about	   a	   further	   loss	   of	  
autonomy,	   while	   the	   federal	   government	   aspired	   more	   leeway	   in	   negotiations	   at	   the	  
supranational	   level.	   Furthermore,	   fiscally	   strong	   Länder	   demanded	   more	   legal	   and	   fiscal	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resources	   to	   position	   themselves	   more	   autonomously	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   accelerating	   regional	  
competition	  on	  the	  European	  scale.	  
The	  twin	  pressure	  of	  Reunification	  and	  Europeanization	  thus	  represent	  the	  backdrop	  for	  reform	  
dynamics	  in	  Germany.	  Between	  1992	  and	  2009,	  these	  dynamics	  ushered	  in	  a	  sequence	  of	  three	  
constitutional	   reforms.	   The	   first	   constitutional	   reform	   began	   with	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   joint	  
commission	   of	   the	   Bundestag	   and	   Bundesrat	   in	   1992.	   The	   commission’s	   mandate	   was	   to	  
prepare	   an	   encompassing	   proposal	   for	   constitutional	   change	   to	   bring	   the	   Basic	   Law	  
(Grundgesetz)	  in	  line	  with	  post-­‐reunification	  realities.	  Accordingly,	  the	  federal	  architecture	  was	  
just	   one	   reform	   target	   among	   others,	   but	   it	   represented	   a	   focal	   point	   in	   the	   debate.	   Among	  
other	   things,	   the	   Bundesrat’s	   initiative	   to	   additionally	   install	   its	   own	   commission,	   the	  
Kommission	   Verfassungsreform	   (Commission	   Constitutional	   Reform)	   in	   1991	   and	   which	  
presented	  its	  report	  one	  year	  later	  (Bundesrat	  1992),	  highlights	  the	  significance	  federal	  reform	  
advocates	  ascribed	  to	  the	  constitutional	  reform.6	  	  
Substantial	   proposals	   to	   realign	   the	   federal	   architecture	  with	   the	   principle	   of	   self-­‐rule	   failed,	  
however,	   largely	  due	  to	  resistance	  from	  the	  federal	  government	  and	  the	  Bundestag.	  The	  main	  
achievement	   of	   the	   constitutional	   reform	   was	   to	   protect	   the	   Länder	   from	   ongoing	   federal	  
usurpation	   of	   concurrent	   legislation.	  More	   importantly,	   the	   reform	   ultimately	   reinforced	   the	  
established	   system	  of	   joint-­‐decision	  making	   by	   significantly	   expanding	   Länder	   participation	   in	  
federal	  decision	  making	  through	  the	  new	  Article	  23.	  This	  new	  constitutional	  provision	  furnished	  
the	  Länder	  with	  far	  reaching	  veto	  rights	  in	  matters	  subject	  to	  Europeanization.	  	  
The	  perceived	  need	  for	  a	  major	  federal	  reform	  prevailed.	  During	  the	  late	  1990s	  and	  early	  2000s,	  
federalism	   was	   increasingly	   blamed	   for	   Reformstau	   (reform	   jam)	   –	   a	   notion	   that	   began	   to	  
determine	  Germany’s	  political	  agenda	  in	  the	  late	  1990s.	  It	  expresses	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  political	  
system	   to	   carry	   out	   structural	   adjustments	   that	  were	  widely	   perceived	   as	   inescapable.	   In	   the	  
light	   of	   culminating	   economic	   and	   fiscal	   problems	   and	   the	   permanent	   impression	   of	   political	  
deadlock,	  which	  was	  primarily	  ascribed	  to	  hard-­‐going	  negotiations	  between	  the	  Bundestag	  and	  
                                                
6	  An	  early	  example	  for	  how	  the	  Länder	  anticipated	  the	  prospects	   for	  a	   federal	  reform	  is	  the	   joint	  Decision	  of	  the	  
Minister	   Presidents	   (i.e	   the	   heads	   of	   Länder	   governments)	   as	   of	   July	   5	   1990,	   which	   called	   for	   fundamental	  
reorganization	  of	  the	  federal	  architecture	  in	  Germany.	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Bundesrat	  (alongside	  other	  manifestations	  of	   joint-­‐decision	  making),	  political	  actors	  from	  both	  
tiers	  of	  government	  agreed	  on	  another	  attempt	  to	  reform	  the	  federal	  architecture.	  Even	  more	  
than	  in	  the	  early	  1990s,	  the	  goal	  of	  self-­‐rule	  through	  sweeping	  dis-­‐entanglement	  animated	  the	  
reform	  discourse.	  	  
For	   many	   observers,	   the	   Föderalismusreform	   I	   (2004-­‐2006)	   emerged	   within	   a	   window	   of	  
opportunity,	  indicating	  a	  rather	  unique,	  deep	  commitment	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  leading	  negotiators	  
to	  tackle	  the	  main	  pathologies	  of	  German	  federalism.	  At	  the	  outset	  at	  least,	  the	  spirit	  of	  reform	  
raised	   high	   expectations.	   A	   redirection	   towards	   self-­‐rule	   was	   to	   be	   achieved	   through	  
substantially	   increased	   Länder	   autonomy,	   a	   substantial	   reallocation	   of	   competences	   and	  
disentanglement	  of	  financial	  flows	  between	  both	  levels	  of	  government.	  	  
Despite	   this	   overall	   agreement,	   however,	   the	   reform	   agenda	   ultimately	   excluded	   fiscal	  
federalism.	  This	  was	  mainly	  due	  to	  concerns	  raised	  by	  the	  majority	  of	  fiscally	  weak	  Länder,	  who,	  
like	   the	   federal	   government,	   shied	   away	   from	   touching	   the	   allocation	   of	   tax	   powers	   or	   even	  
equalization.	   It	   was	   agreed	   though	   to	   renegotiate	   fiscal	   federalism	   in	   a	   separate,	   succeeding	  
step	  –	  the	  Föderalismureform	  II	  (2007-­‐2009).	  
The	  Föderalismureform	   I	  was	   the	  most	   comprehensive	   constitutional	   reform	  of	   the	  Basic	   Law	  
since	  1949.	   The	   reform	  had	   two	  main	   targets:	   the	  allocation	  of	   competences	  and	   the	   second	  
chamber.	   First,	   dis-­‐entanglement	   (Entflechtung)	   was	   to	   be	   accomplished	   through	   a	   major	  
reallocation	   of	   competences.	   The	   reform	   abolished	   the	   framework	   legislation,	   redefined	   a	  
number	   of	   concurrent	   matters	   and	   reassigned	   them	   between	   both	   tiers	   of	   government.	   In	  
addition,	   the	  Länder	  were	   furnished	  with	   two	  different	   types	  of	  opting	  out	  provisions.	  One	   is	  
rather	   procedural	   and	   permits	   Länder	   to	   opt	   out	   from	   certain	   implementation	   requirements	  
imposed	  on	  them	  by	   the	   federal	  government,	   the	  other	   is	  material	  and	  applies	   to	  six	  matters	  
falling	  under	  concurrent	  legislation.	  	  
Second,	   the	   reform	   reduced	   the	   number	   of	   bills	   for	   which	   the	   Bundesrat	   had	   enjoyed	   an	  
absolute	   veto.	  While	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   exactly	   determine	   the	   amount	   to	  which	   the	   reform	   has	  
reduced	   this	   type	  of	  bills,	   the	   so	   called	  Zustimmungsgesetze,	   a	   report	   issued	  by	   the	  Research	  
Services	  of	  the	  Bundestag	  estimates	  an	  overall	  decrease	  of	  Zustimmungsgesetze	  from	  55,2	  %	  to	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25,8	   or	   51	  %	   to	   24	  %	   -­‐	   depending	   on	   the	   legislative	   session	   taken	   as	   a	   reference	   (Deutscher	  
Bundestag	  2006:	  3).	  
Although	   the	   Föderalismureform	   II	   had	   initially	   been	   envisaged	   as	   a	   successive	   reform	   step	  
dedicated	  to	  structurally	  reorder	  fiscal	  federalism,	  most	  notably	  the	  allocation	  of	  tax	  revenues,	  
it	   failed	   to	   do	   so.	   The	   conservative	   governments	   of	   fiscally	   strong	   Länder,	   Bavaria,	   Baden-­‐
Württemberg	   and	   Hesse,	   who	   envisaged	   more	   self-­‐rule	   through	   a	   reform	   equalization	  
programme	  and	  greater	   tax	  autonomy,	  were	  unable	   to	  even	  put	   those	   issues	  on	   the	  agenda.	  
Under	   the	   impression	   of	   the	   Global	   Financial	   Crisis,	   the	   federal	   government	   and	   the	   Länder	  
instead	  settled	  for	  proposals	  envisaging	  institutional	  mechanisms	  to	  incrementally	  reduce	  debt	  
and	  deficits	  on	  both	  levels	  of	  government.	  The	  reform’s	  main	  achievement	  eventually	  was	  the	  
introduction	  of	  a	  debt	  brake	  (Schuldenbremse).	  This	  mechanism	  obliges	  the	  federal	  government	  
and	  the	  Länder	   to	  substantially	   reduce	  their	  debts	  until	  2020	  and	  to	  balance	  their	  budgets.	   In	  




Despite	   its	   more	   decentralized	   nature,	   Swiss	   federalism	   shares	   certain	   similarities	   with	   the	  
German	   case.	   Over	   the	   course	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century,	   the	   Swiss	   federal	   architecture	   has	  
witnessed	  an	   incremental	  process	  of	   change	   that	  more	   firmly	   intertwined	  both	  governmental	  
tiers.	  Indeed,	  the	  Cantons	  generally	  enjoy	  a	  larger	  scope	  of	  autonomy	  than	  the	  German	  Länder,	  
both	  materially	  and	  procedurally.	  They	  not	  only	  hold	  more	  exclusive	  powers	  in	  a	  comparatively	  
broad	   range	   of	   fields,	   including	   taxation	   powers,	   but	   also	   maintain	   more	   leeway	   when	  
implementing	  federal	  legislation.	  However,	  with	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  modern	  welfare	  state	  the	  
federal	   level	  was	  able	  to	  assume	  more	   legislative	  competences	  while	  the	  Cantons	  retained	  an	  
important	   role	   in	   the	   implementation	   process	   (Vatter	   and	  Wälti	   2003;	   Linder	   2007).	  Growing	  
interdependencies	  are	  also	  evident	  in	  fiscal	  federalism.	  The	  federal	  level	  has	  sought	  to	  influence	  
cantonal	  policy-­‐making	  through	  incrementally	  expanding	  the	  system	  of	  vertical	  transfers.	  Until	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the	  early	  1990s,	  federal	  transfers	  amounted	  to	  more	  than	  100	  specific	  transfers	  and	  more	  than	  
30	  different	  equalization	  payments	  (EFD	  2007:	  7).	  
This	   ongoing	   trend	   towards	   more	   shared-­‐rule	   was	   increasingly	   perceived	   as	   a	   problem.	   Not	  
surprisingly,	   Swiss	   reform	   discourse	   resembled	   in	   many	   respects	   the	   one	   in	   Germany.	  
Inefficiency,	   democratic	   deficits	   and	   declining	   local	   autonomy	   were	   identified	   as	   the	   main	  
pathologies	   generated	   through	   the	   established	   federal	   architecture.	   Like	   in	   Germany,	   federal	  
reform	   in	   Switzerland	   –	   the	   so	   called	  Neue	   Finanzausgleich	   (NFA)	   –	   had	   as	   its	   main	   goal	   to	  
strengthen	  self-­‐rule,	  which	  was	  to	  be	  achieved	  through	  widespread	  dis-­‐entanglement:	  
“The	  NFA	   invigorates	  the	  principle	  of	  subsidiarity.	  Wherever	  possible,	   tasks,	  competences	  and	  
fiscal	   flows	   between	   the	   federal	   level	   and	   the	   Cantons	   were	   dis-­‐entangled.	   The	   goal	   was	   to	  
strengthen	  state	  and	  fiscal	  capacities	  of	  the	  federal	  level	  and	  the	  Cantons”	  (EFD	  2007:	  6,	  author	  
translation).	  
At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   German	   and	   Swiss	   cases	   reveal	   important	   differences.	   Anticipating	   a	  
difficult	  ratification	  process	  due	  to	  the	  institutions	  of	  direct	  and	  consociational	  democracy,	  the	  
NFA	   was	   structured	   from	   the	   outset	   as	   a	   comprehensive,	   inclusive	   and	   iterative	   long-­‐term	  
process.	  The	  reform	  was	  officially	   launched	   in	  1994,	  became	  enacted	   in	  2004	  and	  effective	   in	  
2008.	   It	   involved	   numerous	   hearings,	   the	   identification	   of	   problems	   and	   several	   rounds	   of	  
negotiation.	   In	  doing	  so,	  as	  Dietmar	  Braun	  (2009)	  has	  argued,	  the	  reform	  process	  envisaged	  a	  
procedural	   separation	   of	   “problem-­‐solving”	   and	   “redistributive	   bargaining”	   sequences	   –	   a	  
necessary	  condition	  for	  its	  ultimate	  success.	  
Another	   important	  difference	  between	  the	  Swiss	  and	  the	  German	  case	  pertains	  to	  the	  reform	  
targets.	   While	   in	   Germany	   actors	   shied	   away	   from	   setting	   taxation	   and	   equalization	   on	   the	  
agenda,	   the	   latter	  –	  equalization	  –	  was	   the	  Swiss	   reform’s	   focal	  point.7	   The	   starting	  point	   for	  
reforming	   the	   Swiss	   federal	   architecture	  was,	   therefore,	   a	   deliberate	   attempt	   to	   reorder	   one	  
core	   component	   of	   fiscal	   federalism.	   This	   was	   then	   connected	   to	   deliberations	   on	   a	  
fundamental	  reallocation	  of	  competences	  between	  the	  federal	  level	  and	  the	  Cantons	  in	  order	  to	  
                                                
7	  Neuer	  Finanzausgleich	  translates	  into	  New	  Fiscal	  Equalization	  Regime.	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restore	  the	  principle	  of	  subsidiarity	  or,	  in	  other	  words:	  to	  redirect	  the	  federal	  architecture	  from	  
shared-­‐rule	  towards	  self-­‐rule.8	  
The	  NFA	  basically	  abolished	  the	  highly	  complex	  previous	  system	  of	  fiscal	  transfers	  and	  replaced	  
it	   with	   two	   new	   elements.	   The	   first	   pillar	   of	   this	   system,	   resource	   equalization	  
(Ressourcenausgleich),	  assures	  that	  all	  Cantons	  have	  a	  minimum	  floor	  of	  guaranteed	  revenues	  
amounting	  to	  at	  least	  eighty	  five	  percent	  of	  the	  average	  revenue	  of	  all	  Cantons.	  Fiscally	  strong	  
Cantons	  and	  the	  federal	  level	  contribute	  to	  this	  equalization	  fund,	  and	  their	  respective	  share	  is	  
determined	   by	   a	   constitutional	   formula.	   The	   second	   pillar,	   specific	   burden	   compensation	  
(Lastenausgleich),	  provides	  those	  Cantons	  who	  face	  an	  extraordinary	  cost	  intensive	  burden	  such	  
as	  urban	  centres	  or	  mountainous	  regions	  with	  additional	  revenues	  (EFD	  2007:	  13-­‐16).	  
The	   accompanying	   reallocation	   of	   competences	   primarily	   focused	   on	   a	   broad	   range	   of	  
previously	   shared	   jurisdictions.	   The	   rationale	   behind	   the	   process	   of	   dis-­‐entanglement	   and	  
reassignment	  was	  the	  principle	  of	  subsidiarity.	  Through	  the	  NFA	  reform,	  jurisdictions	  calling	  for	  
state-­‐wide	   solutions	  were	  more	   explicitly	   tailored	   as	   federal	   competences	  while	   the	   cantonal	  
influence	  was	  further	  diminished	  or	  completely	  abolished.	  For	  example,	  this	  was	  the	  case	  with	  
the	   social-­‐insurance-­‐based	   pillar	   of	   the	   Swiss	   pension	   system	   (the	   AHV),	   trans-­‐regional	  
infrastructure	   or	   defence.	  Other	   shared	   responsibilities	   in	   areas	   such	   as	   social	   assistance	   and	  
welfare,	   education	   or	   environmental	   policy	   were	   redesigned	   as	   exclusively	   cantonal	  
jurisdictions.	  An	   important	   feature	  of	  dis-­‐entanglement	  was	   to	  ensure	   that	   responsibilities	   for	  
both	   the	   task	   itself	   and	   corresponding	   funding	   were	   consistently	   anchored	   with	   one	  
governmental	  tier.	  
	   	  
                                                
8	   A	   third	   reform	   target	  was	   the	   system	  of	   intergovernmental	   relations.	   The	  NFA	   brought	   about	   several	   changes	  
intended	   to	   make	   vertical	   and	   horizontal	   collaboration	   more	   efficient	   and,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   more	   flexible	   as	  
Cantons	   are	   now	   obliged	   to	  work	   towards	   jointly	   agreed	   global	   objectives,	   endowed	  with	   lump	   sum	   payments.	  
These	  arrangements	  break	  with	  previous	  modes	  which	  subsidized	  numerous	  more	  specific	  measures.	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Do	  Federal	  Reforms	  Matter?	  Preliminary	  Insights	  from	  Comparison	  	  
At	   least	   as	   important	   as	   the	   enactment	   of	   the	   reform	   itself	   is	   the	   question	   of	   its	   long-­‐term	  
sustainability	   or	   impact.	   There	   is	   no	   guarantee	   at	   all	   that	   an	   enacted	   reform	   ultimately	  
reconfigures	  political	  dynamics	   in	  federal	  systems.	  On	  the	  contrary,	   it	   is	  especially	   in	  the	  early	  
post-­‐enactment	   period	  when	   reform	  opponents	  might	   try	   to	   undermine	   and	   subvert	   political	  
change	   and	   redirect	   the	   federal	   trajectory	   back	   on	   the	   previous	   path.	   Successful	   reforms,	  
therefore,	  rest	  on	  conditions	  that	  promote	   its	   long	  term	  sustainability.	  According	  to	  Patashnik	  
(2008),	   the	   sustainability	   of	   reforms	   lasts	   on	   at	   least	   two	   conditions:	   a	   significant	   shift	   in	   the	  
institutional	  configuration	  (including	  some	  form	  of	  institutional	  protection	  of	  reform	  outcomes)	  
and	  positive	  feedback	  effects	  that	  need	  to	  accrue	  from	  reform	  innovation.	  
A	  preliminary	  assessment	  of	  institutional	  reforms	  in	  the	  four	  federations	  suggests	  that	  there	  are	  
two	   rather	   sustainable	   (Australia	   and	   Switzerland)	   and	   two	   rather	   unsustainable	   pathways	  
(Canada	   and	   Germany).	   Accordingly,	   each	   group	   contains	   a	   rather	   successful	   and	   a	   rather	  
unsuccessful	  case	  of	  reform.	  
The	   first	  group	   (Australia	  and	  Canada)	   represents	   institutional	   reforms	  destined	  to	  strengthen	  
shared-­‐rule	  within	  a	  self-­‐rule	  architecture.	  A	  preliminary	  assessment	  indicates	  that	  institutional	  
innovations	   in	  Australia	  have	  produced	  some	  change	  for	   federal	  politics,	  while	   their	   impact	   in	  
Canada	  was	  rather	  negligible.	  Neither	  in	  Australia	  nor	  in	  Canada	  have	  reform	  outcomes	  enjoyed	  
an	   effective	   institutional	   protection,	   not	   least	   because	   they	   were	   conducted	   as	   non-­‐
constitutional	   change.	   However,	   the	   Australian	   case	   points	   to	   positive	   feedback	   with	   key	  
political	  actors.	  
The	   spirit	   of	   collaborative	   federalism	   in	   Australia	   seems	   to	   have	   resonated	   well	   among	  
important	  political	  actors	  in	  the	  federal	  arena.	  First,	  the	  GST	  has	  been	  considered,	  by	  and	  large,	  
as	  having	  slightly	  enhanced	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  States.	  Parkin	  and	  Anderson	  (2007:	  297)	  even	  
coined	   this	   reform	   the	   “GST	   revolution”,	   and	   “the	   single,	   most	   important	   reform	   to	  
Commonwealth-­‐State	  financial	  relations	  since	  the	  imposition	  of	  uniform	  national	  income	  tax	  in	  
1942”.	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Second,	   from	   its	   inception	   in	   1992,	   COAG	   has	   become	   active	   in	   a	   broad	   palette	   of	   matters	  
including	   highly	   sensitive	   areas	   such	   as	   education,	   child	   care,	   infrastructure,	   energy,	   housing,	  
security	  or	  fiscal	  federalism.	  In	  2007,	  after	  the	  Howard	  government	  was	  defeated	  by	  the	  Labor	  
government	  under	  Kevin	  Rudd,	  COAG’s	  role	  as	  the	  peak	  organization	  within	  the	  federal	  system	  
was	  reinforced	  through	  a	  comprehensive	  overhaul	  of	  its	  organizational	  structure.	  This	  included,	  
among	   other	   things,	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   COAG	   Reform	   Council	   as	   an	   independent	  
monitoring	  body	  and	  the	  formulation	  of	  a	  broadly	  envisaged	  long	  term	  reform	  agenda.	  Perhaps	  
the	  most	  important	  recent	  achievement	  was	  the	  IGAFFR	  of	  2008.	  This	  agreement	  indicates	  that	  
the	   Australian	   federation	   seems	   to	   further	   move	   towards	   the	   pole	   of	   shared-­‐rule	   as	   it	  
established	  several	  provisions	  requiring	  unanimous	  agreement	  for	  changing	  the	  status	  quo.	  	  
The	  sheer	  number	  of	  agreements	  and	  partnerships	   that	  have	  emerged	  under	   the	  umbrella	  of	  
COAG	  demonstrate	  a	  degree	  of	  institutionalization	  that	  is	  hardly	  conceivable	  in	  Canada,	  where	  
intergovernmental	  relations	  have	  remained	  in	  a	  rather	  erratic	  state	  of	  flux	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
1990s.	   For	   the	   brief	   period	   between	   2004	   and	   2006,	   after	   Paul	   Martin	   had	   replaced	   Jean	  
Chretien	   as	   Prime	   Minister,	   it	   seemed	   as	   if	   a	   more	   collaborative	   approach	   would	   indeed	  
reemerge	   here,	   too.	   Under	   the	   heading	   “The	   Ghost	   of	   Chretien	   is	   banished”,	   the	   Globe	   and	  
Mail,	  for	  instance,	  acclaimed	  the	  Health	  Accord	  of	  2004	  between	  Ottawa	  and	  the	  Provinces	  as	  
the	   “most	   important	   federal-­‐provincial	   deal	   since	   the	   constitution	   came	   home”.	   In	   addition,	  
several	  bilateral	  agreements	  on	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  pan-­‐Canadian	  system	  of	  Early	  Learning	  
and	   Childcare	   were	   considered	   to	   exemplify	   a	   serious	   commitment	   to	   revive	   cooperative	  
federalism	  in	  Canada.	  	  
With	   the	   advent	   of	   the	   Conservative	   government	   of	   Stephen	   Harper	   in	   2006,	   however,	   this	  
approach	  came	   to	  an	  end.	  Under	   the	   label	  of	   “open	   federalism”,	  Harper	  has	  been	   inclined	   to	  
reconfigure	  the	  federal	  system	  again	  more	  in	  line	  with	  self-­‐rule.	  This	  approach	  seems	  to	  avoid	  
Chrétien-­‐style	   unilateral	   initiatives	   in	   exclusively	   provincial	   jurisdictions	   just	   as	   it	   avoids	   any	  
collaborative	   efforts	  with	   the	  Provinces	   –	   an	   approach	   Friendly	   and	  White	   (2012)	  have	  nicely	  
coined	  as	  “no-­‐lateralism”.	  Notably,	  one	  of	  the	  first	  initiatives	  of	  the	  Harper	  government	  was	  the	  
termination	  of	  all	  existing	   intergovernmental	  agreements	  on	  Early	  Learning	  and	  Childcare	  and	  
their	  unilateral	  displacement	  with	  a	  direct	  individual	  federal	  transfer	  for	  parents,	  the	  Universal	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Child	   Care	  Benefit	   (UCCB)	   in	   2007.	  Moreover,	   SUFA	  does	   not	   appear	   to	   play	   any	   role	   for	   the	  
conduct	  of	  intergovernmental	  relations	  anymore,	  if	  it	  ever	  had.	  
Efforts	  to	  strengthen	  horizontal	  ties	  among	  the	  Canadian	  Provinces	  have	  obviously	  been	  slightly	  
more	  sustainable.	  Since	  its	   inception	  about	  10	  years	  ago,	  the	  COF	  has	   launched	  initiatives	   in	  a	  
range	   of	   areas,	   spanning	   topics	   such	   as	   postsecondary	   education,	   Canada	   in	   the	   Global	  
Economy,	  health	  care	  and,	  most	  notably,	  the	  fiscal	  imbalance.	  Over	  the	  first	  few	  years	  after	  its	  
establishment,	   the	   CAF	   in	   Australia	   promised	   to	   become	   an	   even	   more	   visible	   and	   active	  
horizontal	  body	  than	  the	  COF	  in	  Canada.	  Until	  2010,	  the	  CAF	  has	  produced	  a	  great	  number	  of	  
reports,	  declarations,	   frameworks,	  benchmarks	  and	  papers	   (the	  so	  called	  “Federalist	  Papers”),	  
outperforming	   the	   output	   of	   the	   COF.	   In	   the	   meantime,	   however,	   this	   level	   activity	   has	  
profoundly	  decreased	  again.	  	  
Despite	   their	   relative	   success,	   reform	   outcomes	   and	   achievements	   in	   Australia	   remain	  
vulnerable.	   The	   recently	   elected	   Liberal	   government	   under	   Tony	   Abbott	   has	   announced	   to	  
reshape	  Australian	  federalism	  once	  again.	  This	  reform	  attempt	  appears	  to	  turn	  back	  the	  wheel,	  
as	   it	   is	   animated	   by	   the	   principle	   of	   self-­‐rule.	   Abbott’s	   language	   resembles	   that	   of	   Stephen	  
Harper	  when	  he	  outlined	  the	  rationale	  for	  “Open	  Federalism”:	  
“We	  need	  to	  clarify	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  for	  states	  and	  territories	  so	  that	  they	  are	  as	  
far	  as	  possible,	  sovereign	  in	  their	  own	  sphere…The	  Commonwealth	  will	  continue	  to	  take	  
a	   leadership	   role	   on	   issues	   of	   genuine	   national	   and	   strategic	   importance,	   but	   there	  
should	   be	   less	   Commonwealth	   intervention	   in	   areas	   where	   states	   have	   primary	  
responsibilities”9	  	  
The	  main	  contours	  of	  Abbotts	  “Reform	  of	  the	  Federation”	  will	  be	  revealed	  in	  a	  White	  Paper	  by	  
the	  end	  of	  2015	  (Prime	  Minister	  of	  Australia	  2014).	  As	  of	  June	  30,	  2014,	  the	  Abbott	  government	  
already	   abolished	   one	   important	   institutional	   innovation	   introduced	   under	   Kevin	   Rudd,	   the	  
COAG	  Reform	  Council.	  
                                                
9	   Quoted	   in:	  Mark	   Kenny	   “Abbott	   launches	   white	   paper	   to	   reduce	   federal-­‐state	   balance	   of	   power”,	   The	   Sidney	  
Morning	  Herald,	  July	  2	  2014.	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Because	   they	  were	  conceived	  as	  constitutional	  change,	   reform	  outcomes	   in	   the	  second	  group	  
(Germany	  and	  Switzerland)	  benefited	  from	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	   institutional	  protection	  than	  in	  
Australia	   and	  Canada.	  As	   the	  post-­‐reform	  dynamics	   in	  Germany	   reveal,	  however,	   institutional	  
protection	  alone	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  make	  federal	  reforms	  work.	  	  
Most	   observers	   agree	   that	   notwithstanding	   the	   quantity	   of	   explicit	   changes	   carried	   out	   in	  
Germany,	  the	  Föderalismureform	  I	  has	  not	  generated	  far	  reaching	  change	  for	  federal	  politics,	  let	  
alone	   a	   substantial	   redirection	   of	   the	   federal	   architecture	   towards	   self-­‐rule	   (Jeffrey	   2008;	  
Scharpf	  2009).	  Despite	  its	  formal	  ratification,	  the	  constitutional	  reform	  can	  even	  be	  considered	  
as	  a	  failure	  if	  measured	  against	  the	  ambitious	  goals	  political	  entrepreneurs	  had	  formulated	  prior	  
to	   the	   reform.	   These	   shortcomings	   become	   even	  more	   obvious	   if	   compared	   to	   the	   relatively	  
successful	  case	  of	  Switzerland.	  
In	   Switzerland,	   federal	   reform	   entailed	   a	   comprehensive	   reorganization	   of	   competences	   that	  
was	  instantly	  linked	  to	  a	  major	  reform	  of	  fiscal	  relations	  among	  all	  governmental	  tiers.	  Neither	  
important	  jurisdictions	  such	  as	  education,	  pensions	  or	  infrastructure	  nor	  the	  highly	  controversial	  
area	   of	   fiscal	   federalism	   were	   excluded	   from	   the	   agenda.	   This	   is	   exactly	   what	   happened	   in	  
Germany:	  The	  majority	  of	  fiscally	  weak	  Länder	  governments	  refused	  to	  talk	  about	  finances	  from	  
the	  outset.	   In	   addition,	  only	   rather	  narrowly	  defined	   jurisdictions	  were	  ultimately	   re-­‐assigned	  
between	   the	   federal	   government	   and	   the	   Länder.	   While	   the	   Länder	   demanded	   major	  
competences	  to	  increase	  their	  capacity	  for	  self-­‐rule,	  the	  reform	  commission	  ended	  up	  splitting	  
coherent	  matters	   into	  very	  narrowly	  defined,	  rather	  trivial	  “mini	  competences”	  (Scharpf	  2008:	  
519),	  which	  were	  then	  assigned	  to	  either	  the	  federal	  or	  the	  Land	   level.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  
Länder	  received	  jurisdictions	  such	  as	  the	  regulation	  of	  leisure	  activity	  noise	  (instead	  of	  regional	  
environmental	  policy),	  the	  regulation	  of	  shop	  closing	  hours	  (instead	  of	  regional	  economic	  policy)	  
or	  the	  control	  over	  old-­‐age	  homes	  (instead	  of	  regional	  social	  policy)	  (Scharpf	  2008:	  514).	  	  
Likewise,	  while	  Länder	  governments	  demanded	  a	  general	  right	  to	  opt	  out	  from	  those	  concurrent	  
matters	  that	  had	  been	  preempted	  by	  the	  federal	  government,	  the	  reform	  commission	  approved	  
of	  opting	  out	  provisions	  for	  only	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  rather	  negligible	  matters	  (such	  as	  hunting).	  
Finally,	   while	   the	   reform	  might	   have	   accomplished	   a	   significant	   reduction	   of	   bills	   subject	   to	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approval	  of	   the	  Bundesrat,	   the	  Länder	  executives	   retain	  a	  veto	   right	   in	  all	  potentially	  conflict-­‐
laden	  areas	  which	  already	  had	  been	   subject	   to	  deadlock	   in	   the	  past.	  Despite	   the	  quantitative	  
reduction,	  therefore,	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Bundesrat	  essentially	  remains	  untouched.	  
Moreover,	   it	   is	   hardly	   discernible	   that	   those	   institutional	   innovations	   which	   eventually	   bear	  
some	   potential	   for	   shifting	   Germany’s	   long	   established	   pathway	   onto	   a	   new	   track	   have	  
generated	   positive	   feedback	   so	   far.	   Especially	   under	   the	   condition	   of	   different	   partisan	  
majorities	   in	   the	   Bundestag	   and	   Bundesrat,	   lowest	   common	   denominator	   politics	   or	   even	  
deadlock	  is	  very	  likely	  to	  resurface	  again.10	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Länder	  seem	  to	  be	  rather	  reluctant	  
to	  use	   their	  new	  right	   to	  opt	  out	   from	  certain	  countrywide	   regulations.	  Until	  2009,	  an	  official	  
survey	   reports	   that	   there	   have	   only	   been	   two	   deviations	   in	   concurrent	   matters	   and	   three	  
deviations	  from	  procedural	  regulations	  (Deutscher	  Bundestag	  2009:	  34f.).	  	  
In	  contrast,	  federal	  reform	  in	  Switzerland	  is	  widely	  believed	  to	  be	  an	  example	  for	  a	  sustainable	  
reform	  path.	  According	  to	  Dietmar	  Braun	  (2009,	  315),	  the	  NFA	  “…means	  a	  profound	  change	  in	  
philosophy	   and	   practice”.	   The	   Swiss	   reform	   was	   much	   more	   encompassing	   in	   dis-­‐entangling	  
material	  and	  fiscal	  institutional	  linkages	  between	  the	  federal	  level	  and	  the	  Cantons.	  Moreover,	  
the	   reform	   process	   itself	   differed	   profoundly.	   While	   in	   Germany	   the	   reform	   was	   ultimately	  
negotiated	   among	   the	   executives	   from	   both	   governmental	   tiers,	   in	   Switzerland	   the	   process	  
incrementally	   evolved	  over	   a	  period	  of	   about	   ten	   years,	  with	   iterative	   sequences	   focusing	  on	  
problem-­‐solving	   and	   bargaining.	   It	   was	   also	   more	   inclusive	   as	   representatives	   from	   all	  
governmental	  tiers	  and	  branches	  as	  well	  as	  society	  were	  involved.	  This	  encompassing	  approach	  
to	   federal	   reform	   not	   only	   ensured	   its	   ratification,	   but	   seems	   to	   foster	   its	   long-­‐term	  
sustainability.	  
	   	  
                                                
10	  And	  indeed,	  after	  the	  Social	  Democratic	  Party,	  in	  combination	  with	  the	  Greens	  and	  the	  Socialists,	  have	  gained	  a	  
majority	  of	  votes	  in	  the	  Bundesrat	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  election	  in	  Lower	  Saxony	  in	  January	  of	  2013,	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  
opposition	   in	   the	  Bundestag,	   Frank-­‐Walter	   Steinmeier,	   announced	   right	  away	   that	   the	  opposition	  would	  be	  very	  
inclined	   to	   use	   their	   new	   power	   position	   (Süddeutsche	   Zeitung,	   Steinmeier	   will	  Mehrheit	   im	   Bundesrat	   nutzen,	  
January	  21,	  2013).	  




Institutional	   reforms	   in	   federal	   systems	   display	   considerable	   variation.	   This	   does	   not	   mean,	  
however,	   that	   they	  evolve	   in	  an	  erratic	  or	  even	  arbitrary	  pattern.	  Nor	  do	   they	   simply	   revolve	  
around	  the	  question	  of	  centralization	  versus	  decentralization.	  
This	  study	  suggests	  to	  grasp	  federal	  reforms	  as	  a	  deliberate	  attempt	  to	  rebalance	  self-­‐rule	  and	  
shared-­‐rule	   within	   a	   historically	   established	   institutional	   architecture.	   Federal	   systems	   that	  
traditionally	  tilt	  more	  towards	  self-­‐rule,	   like	  Australia	  or	  Canada,	  tend	  to	  suffer	  from	  problems	  
such	   as	   duplication,	   overlap	   or	   unilateralism.	   Accordingly,	   institutional	   reforms	   often	   seek	   to	  
foster	   cooperation	  –	  or	   shared-­‐rule	  –	   in	  order	   to	   reduce	   such	  pathologies.	  Vice	  versa,	   federal	  
systems	   that	   lean	   towards	   shared-­‐rule,	   like	   Germany	   and	   Switzerland,	   are	   more	   prone	   to	  
generate	  democratic	  deficits,	  inefficiencies	  or	  even	  deadlock.	  Institutional	  reforms	  then	  aim	  for	  
strengthening	  self-­‐rule	  through	  dis-­‐entanglement.	  	  
The	  institutional	  architecture	  in	  federal	  systems	  is	  more	  than	  just	  an	  allocation	  of	  competences,	  
featuring	  also	  fiscal	  federalism,	  a	  system	  of	  intergovernmental	  relations	  and	  a	  second	  chamber.	  
Reform	  proponents	  can,	  therefore,	  envisage	  different	  elements,	  with	   important	  consequences	  
for	   the	  nature	  of	   reform.	  Federal	   reforms	  vary	   in	   terms	  of	   their	  scope	   (focused:	  Australia	  and	  
Canada,	  or	   encompassing:	  Germany	  and	  Switzerland)	   and	  mode	   (non-­‐constitutional:	  Australia	  
and	  Canada,	  or	  constitutional:	  Germany	  and	  Switzerland).	  
Finally,	   a	   broadly	   conceived	   comparison	   of	   the	   politics	   of	   federal	   reform	   demonstrates	  
important	   differences	   concerning	   the	   sustainability	   –	   or	   impact	   –	   of	   reforms.	   Despite	   their	  
formal	   enactment,	   reforms	   are	   often	   vulnerable	   as	   opponents	   attempt	   to	   roll	   back	   or	  
deliberately	   ignore	  institutional	  change.	  Insights	  from	  comparing	  the	  four	  federations	  basically	  
suggest	  that	  a	  combination	  of	  institutional	  mechanisms	  and	  positive	  feedback	  effects	  are	  crucial	  
to	  prevent	  reforms	  from	  fizzling	  out.	  While	  the	  former	  shield	  institutional	  reform	  from	  efforts	  to	  
reverse	   outcomes	   after	   the	   reform	   had	   been	   enacted,	   the	   latter	   fosters	   post-­‐enactment	  
commitment	   through	   a	   majority	   of	   actors.	   Even	   more	   promising	   is	   a	   proactively	   structured	  
reform	  process	   itself,	   as	   it	  was	   the	  case	   in	  Switzerland.	  This	   requires	   separating	   sequences	  of	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problem-­‐solving	  and	  redistributive	  bargaining	   to	   facilitate	  adequate	  solutions	  and	  to	  minimize	  
resistance	  before	  the	  reform	  becomes	  ratified.	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